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Introduction
American law reflects the stories we tell ourselves about who we are as 
a nation. To illustrate the effect of America’s stories on the law, I identify and 
describe in this essay a particular characteristic of American law: an “action 
bias” – a propensity to bestow disproportionately greater legal significance 
upon affirmative acts than on failures to act – and I argue that this bias 
reflects, in turn, a powerful myth at the core of the self-image of the United 
States, a myth I call the “Immigrant’s Tale.”
I will begin with a particular and remarkable instance of the action 
bias by considering the career of an exceedingly important, albeit somewhat 
obscure federal district court decision: Zippo Manufacturing Company v. 
Zippo Dot Com,1 the case that formulated the framework now used almost 
universally in the determination of personal jurisdiction in Internet cases.
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a summer research grant from Temple University’s Beasley School of Law, 
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1 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
2Of course, the development of the Internet has challenged the law as 
new technologies typically do. Usually the problem is whether to revise old 
legal doctrines in order to deal more adequately with the new reality or to 
develop specially tailored new doctrines. With the Internet, however, this 
usual problem intersects with a vigorous debate over whether the Internet is 
simply a new tool for achieving old objectives in our familiar world or a new 
and strange world altogether.2 For if it is the latter, questions about what the 
law should look like are complicated by questions such as whether the idea of 
law even makes sense in cyberspace.
One important piece of this puzzle was the issue of how to determine 
personal jurisdiction in cases involving the Internet. I say “was” because this 
question has largely been resolved, and its resolution was swift and decisive. 
In the mid-1990’s the doctrinal question seemed up for grabs, with competing 
tests vying for dominance in the marketplace of judicial ideas. In short order, 
however, one particular framework – that announced in Zippo Dot Com –
rapidly achieved preeminence. On the face of it, this is surprising since the 
approach had no obvious logical or policy advantage over its competitors. In 
this essay I want to try to understand the quick and far reaching triumph of 
Zippo Dot Com. Why did that happen, and what does it mean?
2E.g., compare David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996), with Jack Goldsmith, 
Against Cyberanarchy, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475 (1998).
3By 1996, the year before Zippo Dot Com was decided, issues regarding 
the proper test for personal jurisdiction in Internet cases were being raised 
with increasing frequency. The following hypothetical problem illustrates
what the debate was about:
Jack maintains a personal site on the World Wide Web from his 
home computer in New York City. The site includes various family 
photographs, some of Jack’s poetry, several political diatribes, and a 
section entitled “X-Girlfriends,” in which he discusses various women 
he has been involved with. Jack’s Web site can be visited by anyone in 
the world with access to the Internet.
One of Jack’s former girlfriends is Brie, whom Jack dated when 
they were both attending college in New York. After graduation, Brie
moved several times to various places and is currently living in Fargo, 
North Dakota, where she operates a small business. Jack and Brie
have not been in contact with one another since her move; Jack does 
not know that Brie currently lives in North Dakota; and Jack has 
neither traveled to North Dakota nor had dealings with anyone in that 
state.
One day Brie received a phone call from her friend Colby. Colby
also lives and works in Fargo. Bored at her job that afternoon, Colby
had “Googled” Brie’s name on her office computer and followed various 
links that took her to Jack’s Web site. When Colby read his “X-
4Girlfriends” entries, she discovered that Jack had made several 
scandalous assertions about Brie’s personal life. When Brie heard from 
Colby about the nature of these assertions, she visited Jack ’s Web site 
herself, read the relevant entries, and thereupon contacted a lawyer, 
who filed a defamation suit against Jack in a North Dakota state court. 
The court must decide whether it can assert personal jurisdiction 
under a North Dakota statute that authorizes the exercise of long-arm 
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.
The starting place for the court’s inquiry, of course, is the “minimum 
contacts” test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 which famously 
announced that a state court may constitutionally assert long-arm 
jurisdiction over a party to a dispute only if that party has “certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”4 In a series of 
cases adding nuance to this doctrine, the Supreme Court clarified that the 
contacts in question are those that show that the party has “ purposefully 
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”5 and that the party 
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 Id. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
5 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
5“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”6 So has Jack
“purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within 
[North Dakota]”? Should he “reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there”?
What is interesting about Jack’s case is that while he did not direct his 
Internet activities specifically toward North Dakota, he undoubtedly 
understood that his Web page could be accessed from any place, and it was in 
North Dakota that his remarks about Brie had their defamatory effect. Is this 
enough to subject Jack to the jurisdiction of a North Dakota court? 
Within a nine-month span during 1996-1997, two federal district 
courts formulated distinct approaches to jurisdiction in cases involving 
Internet activities that framed the debate for virtually all succeeding cases 
throughout the country. The analyses proposed by Inset Systems, Inc. v. 
Instruction Set, Inc.7 and Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com8
would likely generate opposite results in Brie’s suit against Jack. In brief, 
Inset Systems  supports jurisdiction on the ground that Jack’s Web page was 
“designed to communicate with people . . . in every state;” by contrast, Zippo 
Dot Com opposes jurisdiction on the ground that Jack’s activities are 
essentially “passive” within the territory of North Dakota, depending on 
individuals within that state to take the initiative to access his site. 
6 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
7 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
8 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
6In Section I of this essay, I will examine these competing approaches in 
more detail, but my main concern in that Section is to chronicle the rapid 
emergence of the test formulated in Zippo Dot Com as the overwhelmingly 
dominant framework now used by American courts. That is, my interest is 
not to take sides in the now largely concluded debate; as I expect to 
demonstrate, each approach has important and evident virtues. Rather, I am 
interested in understanding why Zippo Dot Com triumphed so quickly and 
decisively. Precisely because each approach has its virtues, one might have 
anticipated a long struggle among various courts – with some aligning with 
Inset System, some with Zippo Dot Com, and some developing a hybrid as the 
analytical framework of choice for determining jurisdiction in Internet cases. 
So the question I want to ask is, Why did the Zippo Dot Com test achieved 
such a swift and nearly universal appeal over its competitor, the Inset 
Systems test? 
To get at this question, I will develop two ideas. In Section II I will 
describe an “action bias”  in American law; again, this is the propensity of 
American legal doctrine to bestow disproportionately greater legal 
significance to affirmative acts than to failures to act. In Section III, I will 
describe a traditional story, the “Immigrant’s Tale,” that, with several 
important variations, has become central to the dominant conception of what 
defines the United States. Reversing directions, I will argue in Section IV 
that the law’s action bias is understandable in terms of the national self-
7conception illustrated by the Immigrant’s Tale, and in Section V that the test 
for personal jurisdiction formulated in Zippo Dot Com is understandable as a 
particular instantiation of the action bias and, ultimately, of the values 
exemplified in the Immigrant’s Tale.
In developing this analysis, I will focus largely on the due process 
dimension of personal jurisdiction analysis. That seems the obvious approach 
since the judicial treatment of the constitutional parameters of personal 
jurisdiction post-Pennoyer v. Neff9 has been articulated exclusively in due 
process terms. Still, it bears remembering that any extraterritorial projection 
of state power over individuals will raise issues both of fairness toward those 
individual and of comity toward the other states that have interests in the 
dispute (especially the states in which the individuals are physically located 
or are domiciled). The assertion of long-arm jurisdiction is no exception.10
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s claim that modern 
personal jurisdiction cases are concerned exclusively with due process and 
not with the relationship among states,11 federalism continues to play a 
significant role in personal jurisdiction analysis.12 Consequently, the exercise 
9 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
10 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See infra Section VI.
11 Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702 n.10 (1982).
12See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 
(1985)(identifying among the relevant considerations when applying the 
“minimum contacts” test “the interstate judicial system's interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared 
8of long-arm jurisdiction over Jack raises both due process issues regarding 
the fairness of subjecting Jack to the authority of a North Dakota court in 
that particular state and federalism issues regarding the proper respect owed 
New York by North Dakota. So while the discussion in this essay will 
emphasize the due process dimension of the problem, Section VI offers a 
“Postscript” that relates a second story, the “Sovereign’s Tale,” and through 
that story suggests  how the Zippo Dot Com test also resonates with our 
traditional understanding of the federalism dimension of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.
In sum, my thesis is a broad one: I want to suggest, by examining the 
particular example of personal jurisdiction in Internet activity cases, that the 
development of legal doctrine through judicial decisions reflects the stories 
we tell ourselves about who we are as a people and what we stand for as a 
culture. This thesis has direct implications for an important practical 
question: What makes a legal argument persuasive? Lawyers often treat
legal argumentation as being overtly about the techniques of interpreting 
precedent and legislation, about conflicts among competing public polices, 
and perhaps about clashes among moral values. Latent determinants of a 
successful argument might include the personal preferences of individual 
judges, the personal goals of individual legislators, legislative capture by 
interest groups, the current political atmosphere, and so forth. 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies”).
9What I want to add to this list is the suggestion that the success of a 
legal argument may have much to do with whether that argument resonates 
with pervasive and deeply held understandings of what kind of community 
we are and wish to be. Like the myths of all cultures , our stories express that 
collective self-understanding. And like the myths of all cultures, our stories 
infiltrate and shape our norms and our social and political institutions, 
including law. The Immigrant’s and Sovereign’s Tales are among the stories 
we tell ourselves as a culture; the action and territory biases in American law 
are their manifestations; and the triumph of one particular legal argument –
Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” test – is a consequence.
I
The Triumph of Zippo Dot Com (Part 1)
Central to appreciating the jurisdictional issue in the hypothetical 
litigation between Brie and Jack is a question that has puzzled courts over 
the years: whether a bad effect within a geographic location is itself sufficient 
to satisfy the “minimum contacts” test. In the defamation context, the United 
States Supreme Court held in Calder v. Jones13 that the Florida authors (a 
reporter and his editor) of an allegedly libelous article published in a 
nationally circulated newspaper could be sued in California where the victim 
13 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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of the libel lived and worked. Unlike the hypothetical Jack, the Calder 
defendants knew that the victim resided there. The Court found that
California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.   
Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on 
the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California.14
But the Court was clearly influenced by more than just the location of the 
“effects.” It went on to observe that defendants wrote and edited an article 
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon 
respondent.  And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt 
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which 
the [publication] has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, 
petitioners must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there" to 
answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. 15
Consequently, the Court concluded, 
In this case, petitioners are primary participants in an alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and 
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis.16
14 Id. at 788-789.
15 Id. at 789-790 (emphasis added). See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 
U.S. 770 (1984)(state where allegedly libelous magazine article circulated can 
assert jurisdiction even though plaintiff lives elsewhere when tort has 
occurred in forum state and defendant has “continuously and deliberately 
exploited the [forum] market”)
16 Id. at 790 (emphasis added).
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While Jack’s Web site generated a tortious effect in North Dakota, it is 
difficult to say that the defamation was “intentionally directed at a [North 
Dakota] resident” in the Calder sense. Jack’s ignorance of Brie’s North 
Dakota residence and his ignorance of who specifically was accessing his Web
page make his conduct more analogous to a manufacturer who places his
product in the “stream of commerce,” only to have it cause injury in some 
forum downstream. Here, the Supreme Court’s signals have been ambiguous. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,17 the Court cited with 
apparent approval18 the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision in Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,19 holding an Ohio 
manufacturer of valves that were ultimately integrated into boilers made by 
a Pennsylvania company liable for injuries caused by a defective valve to an 
Illinois purchaser of one of the boilers. The requisite minimum contacts were 
satisfied in Gray by the valve manufacturer’s knowledge that the boilers 
incorporating its valves were being sold nation-wide. Accordingly, the valve 
manufacturer could expect that its product would find its way to Illinois and 
would benefit from that fact. In Asahi Matal Industries20 the Court split on 
this issue. A four-Justice plurality took the position that “placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more,” was insufficient to 
17 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
18 Id. at 297-98.
19 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
20 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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constitute activity “purposefully directed toward the forum State”;21 four 
other Justices approved generally the “stream of commerce” basis for 
personal jurisdiction, but found the assertion of jurisdiction in the instant 
case unfair for other reasons.22
Again, the terms for applying these principles to Internet activity were 
set by a pair of federal district court cases decided in the mid-1990’s. In April 
1996, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut decided 
Inset Systems. The claim in that case was that the Massachusetts defendant’s 
internet domain address (“INSET.COM”) infringed on the Connecticut 
plaintiff’s trademark. Defendant had no physical presence in Connecticut and 
did not conduct regular business there; accordingly, defendant argued that 
the minimum contacts needed to support jurisdiction in a Connecticut court 
were lacking. In response, the court observed that advertising on the Internet 
is
designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every 
state.   Advertisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 
Internet users within Connecticut alone.   Further, once posted on the 
Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is 
available continuously to any Internet user. ISI [Instruction Set, Inc.] 
21 Id. at 112.
22 Id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J. concurring). The ninth concurring Justice took 
no position on the “stream of commerce” question. Id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J. 
concurring).
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has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing 
business within Connecticut.
 The court concludes that since ISI purposefully directed its 
advertising activities toward this state on a continuing basis since 
March, 1995, it could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being 
hailed into court here.23
The analogy with the “stream of commerce” theory used in Gray is 
straightforward. If one intentionally launches a harm-producing “product,” 
knowing and benefiting from that fact that it can find its way into any state, 
there is no unfairness in holding that individual accountable in the state 
where the harm occurs. Accordingly, since Jack’s Web page was “designed to 
communicate with people . . . in every state” and since “once posted on the 
Internet [it was] available continuously to any Internet user,” the Inset
Systems approach suggests that Jack may well have the requisite minimum 
contacts with North Dakota for that state’s court to assert jurisdiction over 
him.
The case for the Inset Systems approach, with its stream-of-commerce 
resonance, seems especially powerful in light of the Internet’s peculiar 
characteristics. Traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine is fundamentally 
tied to territorial considerations.24 However, a pervasive characteristic of 
23 Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
24 See infra Section VI.
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Internet activity is territorial indeterminacy.25 Like conversations via cell 
phone, individuals can communicate over the Internet without having any 
idea or any means of determining where each participant is located in space. 
By contrast, communication using land-line telephones, mail, telegraph, etc. 
substantially depend upon the recipient of the communication being at a 
particular, identifiable place. 
Similarly, when Internet users access Web sites, it is unclear just 
where those pages “are.” Jack’s Web page is presumably stored on the server 
of some Internet Service Provider but where that server is located may be 
unknown not only to Brie and Colby, but even to Jack. Moreover, the precise 
electronic path that connects Brie to Jack’s Web page is determined ad hoc by 
the architecture of Internet.26
Thus, at the moment when Brie is defamed by the reading of Jack’s “X-
Girlfriends” page, the only readily determinable geographic element of that 
defamation is the location of the reader – that is, the location of the 
defamatory effect. Since Jack is likely uninvolved in the process when his 
Web page is accessed, he is in a position analogous to the valve manufacturer 
in Gray. Having shipped the defective valves to the boiler producer, who 
subsequently determined the subsequent distribution of the boilers, the valve 
25 See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 2. But see, Goldsmith, supra note 2. 
26 HowStuffWorks.com, How Routers Work (visited March 9, 2006) 
<http://computer.howstuffworks.com/router.htm>.
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manuracturer lost control over whether and when its valves would cause 
“effects” in any particular state. 
It is, therefore, not accidental that the approach of Inset Systems 
resonates so strongly with stream-of-commerce theory, as used in cases like 
Gray. In an important sense, that theory is just the further working out of a 
point made by the Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,27
when it observed that the “nationalization of commerce,” coupled with new 
transportation and communication technology, had reduced the importance of 
state borders for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction in 
commercial cases.28 This idea presaged the progressive irrelevancy of 
territory in jurisdictional analysis, culminating in the analysis used Inset 
Systems. And while Brie’s case against Jack is not commercial, McGee ‘s core 
insight of McGee applies: The significance of territory is a relic of an era when 
human interactions and government regulation of human interactions were
largely local. In an era when actors like Jack can harm others without either 
party knowing where the other is located, tying a court’s authority to 
adjudicate the dispute to whether Jack had intentionally directed his harmful 
conduct toward a particular geographic place might seem, to put it 
charitably, a little quaint.
And yet, nine months after Inset Systems, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania decided Zippo Dot Com.
27 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
28 Id. at 222-23; see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-251.
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Another trademark infringement case, the court saw the application of the 
“minimum contacts” test to Internet activity as follows:
[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the 
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is 
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity 
that an entity conducts over the Internet.   This sliding scale is 
consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles.   At one 
end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does 
business over the Internet.   If the defendant enters into contracts with 
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and 
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal 
jurisdiction is proper. . . .   At the opposite end are situations where a 
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site 
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.   A passive Web 
site that does little more than make information available to those who 
are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction.   
. . .  The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a 
user can exchange information with the host computer.   In these 
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level 
of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information 
that occurs on the Web site.29
29 Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citations omitted).
17
Applying this “sliding scale,” the court found that defendant’s activities 
were sufficiently interactive in nature (customers accessing its Web site could 
not only obtain information, but could exchange data and apply for services 
with the company) to establish in conjunction with other activities  the 
requisite minimum contacts. In the process, the court characterized Inset
Systems  as representing “the outer limits of the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction based on the Internet,” implying that the Web site involved in 
Inset Systems fell decidedly toward the “passive” end of the “sliding scale,” 
where we would expect also to find Jack’s personal Web page. Accordingly, if 
“the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of 
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that 
occurs on the Web site,” we might well expect the “sliding scale” test to 
protect Jack from being haled before a North Dakota court.
Rather than taking the Inset Systems approach and reconceiving 
personal jurisdiction doctrine to reflect the technological realities of the 
Internet, Zippo Dot Com reflects the belief that jurisdiction doctrine from the 
pre-Internet era can be employed in a way that does justice to that reality. 
Accordingly, Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” framework carries forward the 
concern in Burger King for determining whether “contacts proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' 
18
with the forum State.”30 It recalls the Hanson Court’s framing of the 
question: Did defendant “purposefully avail[ himself] of the privilege of 
conducting activities in the within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.” As another court that adopted the 
“sliding scale” test put it, the issue from this point of view is whether there 
has been an “express aiming at the forum state”31
My purpose in detailing the analyses in Inset Systems and Zippo Dot 
Com is simply to suggest that these two cases represent different, but 
altogether plausible and defensible understandings of International Shoe’s 
“minimum contacts” doctrine as applied to legal disputes associated with so-
called passive Web sites like Jack’s. Accordingly, there are policy reasons for 
favoring either approach over the other – reasons discussed by the various 
courts that have explicitly chosen between the competing analyses32 and by 
the various scholars who have explored the ins and outs of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine as applied to internet activity.33
And so, one might have expected an extensive struggle between these 
two analytical frameworks in the marketplace of judicial ideas – a struggle 
30 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (emphasis in original), quoted in Zippo Dot 
Com, 952 F. Supp at 1123.
31 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 12 (Cal. 2002).
32 E.g., Barrett v. Catacomb Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724-27 (E.D. Pa. 
1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416-19 (9th Cir. 1997); 
see, Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 6-10.
33 E.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 311, 412-20 (2002); Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward 
Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1345,
1360-79 (2001).
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that might have been won by either approach. But there was little struggle. 
In short order, the “sliding scale” test achieved utter dominance. Today it is 
difficult to find a court that uses the Inset Systems analysis. Even recent 
decisions of Connecticut’s federal District Court, while not overruling Inset
Systems, have tended to distinguish or soften its approach.34
Yet, even as courts succumbed to the seemingly irresistible appeal of 
Zippo Dot Com, there was some a certain resignation, even embarrassment, 
at this capitulation. In an especially thoughtful opinion, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the rejected approach of Inset Systems in fact made 
considerable sense. Its observations are worth quoting at length:
Applying the traditional due process principles governing a 
State's jurisdiction over persons outside of the State based on Internet 
activity requires some adaptation of those principles because the 
Internet is omnipresent--when a person places information on the 
Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every 
jurisdiction.   If we were to conclude as a general principle that a 
person's act of placing information on the Internet subjects that person 
34 American Wholesalers Underwriting, Ltd. v. American Wholesale 
Insurance Group, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 247 (D. Conn. 2004)(distinguishes Inset 
Systems); Divicino v. Polaris Industries,129 F.Supp.2d 425 (D. Conn. 
2001)(softens Inset Systems approach); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d 
104 (D. Conn. 1998)(distinguishes Inset Systems); E-Data Corp. v. 
Micropatent Corp., 989 F.Supp. 173 (D. Conn.1997)(distinguishes Inset 
Systems); Cody v. Ward, 954 F.Supp. 43 (D.Conn. 1997)(distinguishes Inset 
Systems). But see, Pavia v. Club Med, Inc., 1998 WL 229912 (D. Conn. March 
30, 1998)(follows Inset Systems).
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to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the information is 
accessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a 
State has geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist.   
The person placing information on the Internet would be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in every State.
But under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, despite 
advances in technology, State judicial power over persons appears to 
remain limited to persons within the State's boundaries and to those 
persons outside of the State who have minimum contacts with the 
State such that the State's exercise of judicial power over the person 
would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.   
See Hanson [v. Denckla], 357 U.S. at 250-51, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (noting that 
“it is a mistake to assume that [the technological] trend heralds the 
demise of all restrictions”).   But even under the limitations articulated 
in International Shoe and retained by Hanson, the argument could still 
be made that the Internet's electronic signals are surrogates for the 
person and that Internet users conceptually enter a State to the extent 
that they send their electronic signals into the State, establishing 
those minimum contacts sufficient to subject the sending person to 
personal jurisdiction in the State where the signals are received.   
Under this argument, the electronic transmissions “symbolize those 
activities ... within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
21
satisfy the demands of due process.” Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17, 66 
S.Ct. 154.   But if that broad interpretation of minimum contacts were 
adopted, State jurisdiction over persons would be universal, and 
notions of limited State sovereignty and personal jurisdiction would be 
eviscerated.
In view of the traditional relationship among the States and 
their relationship to a national government with its nationwide 
judicial authority, it would be difficult to accept a structural 
arrangement in which each State has unlimited judicial power over 
every citizen in each other State who uses the Internet.   That thought 
certainly would have been considered outrageous in the past when 
interconnections were made only by telephones.   See, e.g., Stover [  v. 
O'Connell Assocs., Inc.], 84 F.3d [132 (4th Cir. 1996),]at 137 (finding a 
defendant's “occasional telephonic requests for information from 
Maryland-based investigation services” to be insufficient to subject the 
defendant to personal jurisdiction in a Maryland court).   But now, 
even though the medium is still often a telephone wire, the breadth 
and frequency of electronic contacts through computers has resulted in 
billions of interstate connections and millions of interstate transactions 
entered into solely through the vehicle of the Internet. The 
convergence of commerce and technology thus tends to push the 
analysis to include a "stream-of-commerce" concept, under which each 
22
person who puts an article into commerce is held to anticipate suit in 
any jurisdiction where the stream takes the article.   But the “stream-
of-commerce” concept, although considered, has never been adopted by 
the Supreme Court as the controlling principle for defining the reach of 
a State's judicial power.   See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 
(1987).35
There is a defensive tone in the Fourth Circuit’s argument – a sense of 
leaning against the wind, resisting the obvious implications of a technology 
that threatens to render highly problematic, if not obsolete, the geographic 
limitations of traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine – implications acted 
on by the court in Inset Systems.
My question then is, why the rapid and overwhelming triumph 
of Zippo Dot Com.?36 It’s eventual success might be understood as an 
35 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712-13 
(2002).
36 Some might maintain that this characterization as, at best, an 
exaggeration. Indeed, Michael Geist detected a movement away from the 
Zippos Dot Com test, beginning in the latter part of 1999, and by 2002, he 
argued, 
Numerous judgments reflect that courts in the United States moved 
toward a broader, effects-based approach when deciding whether or not 
to assert jurisdiction in the Internet context. Under this new approach, 
rather than examining the specific characteristics of a website and its 
potential impact, courts focused their analysis on the actual effects 
that the website had in the jurisdiction. Indeed, courts are now relying 
increasingly on the effects doctrine established by the United States
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.
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instance of conservative allegiance to a venerable, if somewhat musty 
analysis from the doctrine’s past, or it might be rationalized in 
pragmatic terms.37
However, neither of these explanations accounts for the speed of Zippo 
Dot Com’s triumph. I will argue that the overwhelming appeal of Zippo Dot 
Com’s interactive-passive distinction lies significantly in its resonance with a 
pervasive “action bias” in American law: the propensity of American legal 
Geist, supra note 33, at 1371-72. I have suggested in the text that the 
doctrine of Calder v. Jones in fact anticipates the Zippo Dot Com test. 
However, even more to the point of Geist’s concern, most of the cases he 
identifies as distancing themselves from the Zippo Dot Com analysis 
nevertheless invoke that framework and explain how the particular facts 
under consideration fit into it. As an example, the case that Geist points to as 
especially critical of Zippo Dot Com, Millenium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millenium 
Music, LP, 33 F. Supp.2d 907 (1999), still makes use of the Zippo Dot Com
analysis and criticizes the approach of Inset Systems because it lacks “the 
principle that a defendant must “purposefully direct” its activities at or take 
‘deliberate action’ in or create ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state so 
as to provide ‘fair warning’ that such activities may subject defendant to 
jurisdiction in a distant forum,” id., at 922, which raises almost exactly the 
point being explored in this essay. 
Perhaps most telling, in the five years since the appearance of Geist’s article, 
courts have continued to invoke the Zippo Dot Com framework. Indeed, in 
just the first two months of 2006, at least three federal and state appellate 
courts did so. See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Pty, Ltd., Slip Copy, 2006 WL 
348148 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2006); Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 WL 
306645 (Utah Feb 10, 2006); Karstetter v. Voss, 2006 WL 279377 (Tex.Ct. 
App.Feb 07, 2006).
37 See, e.g., Geist, supra note 33, at 1370 (“Error! Main Document 
Only.The widespread approval for the Zippo test should come as little 
surprise. The uncertainty created by the Internet jurisdiction issue led to a 
strong desire for a workable solution that provided a fair balance between the 
fear of a lawless Internet and one burdened by over-regulation. The Zippo 
test seemed the best available alternative. This is particularly true in light of 
the Inset line of cases, which illustrated that the alternative might well be 
the application of jurisdiction by any court, anywhere.”)
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doctrine to assign legal duties as the consequences of active, as opposed to 
passive, behavior. The remainder of this essay will define and give examples 
of this action bias, offer a hypothesis to explain the action bias, and argue 
that the “sliding scale” test of Zippo Dot Com is constructed out of the basic 
elements preferred by the action bias. 
II
The Action Bias in American Law (Part 1)
Zippo Dot Com links the establishment of minimum contacts to 
affirmative action. All Internet Web sites that are accessed by individuals 
operating their computers in the forum state establish contacts with the 
forum by virtue of such access. In this sense, Jack has contacts with North 
Dakota when his defamatory writings are read by Colby and Brie. However, 
the “sliding scale” analysis of Zippo Dot Com suggests that these contacts 
might be insufficient for establishing the personal jurisdiction of a North 
Dakota court because Jack’s Web site is “passive.” By contrast, interactive 
Web sites do create legally sufficient contacts. 
This differential treatment of interactive and passive Internet activity 
is consistent with an enormous number of doctrines throughout the law that 
similarly predicate legal obligations on active rather than to passive 
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conduct.38 Legal duties in American law are generally duties that impose 
limits on action or duties that do not come into being until one has acted. We 
see this again and again in fields as diverse as the law of crimes, torts, 
contracts, and federal income taxation. 
Consider, for example, criminal law. § 2.01 of the Model Penal Code 
reflects prevailing doctrine regarding criminal liability for active versus 
passive behavior:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on 
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an 
act of which he is physically capable.
.  .  .
(3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an 
omission unaccompanied by action unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining 
the offense; or
38 The bias is less pronounced with respect to rights. Many important rights 
protect passive activity. For example, various constitutional rights pertaining 
to the rights of persons when confronted with a police investigation include 
the and extensive right not to cooperate with police searches and the right to 
not be forced to incriminate oneself. To some degree, this protection of 
passivity through the allocation of rights can be seen as the correlative of the 
law’s imposition of duties for active conduct. More generally, however, the 
hypothesis for the action bias that will be developed in the text applies to the 
creation of legal obligations, rather than the designation of legal rights.
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(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by 
law.39
The gist of this provision is that criminal liability presumptively 
attaches only to active behavior that violates declared standards of conduct; 
passive behavior is presumptively insulated from liability. Only when an 
affirmative duty to act is expressly imposed by law can the failure to act lead 
to criminal guilt. Thus, the failure to file an income tax return or (for males) 
the failure to register with the Selective Service are crimes because of laws 
expressly requiring these actions. 
Situations governed by § 2.01(3)(b) are especially revealing in this 
regard. Classic examples involve homicide. If I fail to rescue an unconscious 
eleven-year-old stranger from a shallow pool of water, I am presumptively not 
criminally liable when she subsequently drowns.40 On the other hand, if the 
unconscious child is my eleven-year-old daughter, I would be liable for her 
death. The difference is that the law has “otherwise imposed” on me a duty of 
care with respect to my daughter, whereas it has not done so for the stranger.
By contrast, if I act affirmatively to kill another – by shooting, stabbing, 
poisoning, drowning, etc – it does not matter whether the victim is a stranger 
or my daughter. 
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1), (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
40 It should be noted that there is no problem with causation is such a case. 
The Model Penal Code’s definition of causation and requirements of 
proximity between conduct and result are satisfied in this hypothetical 
problem. See, id., § 2.03(1)(a), (3)(b).
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The duties “otherwise imposed” that can support criminal liability for 
passively causing death tend to be triggered by affirmative action. The four 
traditional sources of such duties – statute, contract, status, and the taking of 
affirmative steps to assist41 – usually require some sort of affirmative act. 
Thus, if I had affirmatively acted to adopt the eleven-year-old stranger, I 
would have then through that action acquired legal obligations toward her, 
which I would violate if I refused to rescue her from the shallow pool.
A less preposterous and increasingly frequent instance of this 
distinction has to do with euthanasia. “Active euthanasia” (i.e., taking 
affirmative action to kill someone who is suffering) subjects the actor to 
possible prosecution; by contrast, “passive euthanasia” (e.g., terminating life 
support such as a ventilator) does not.42 However, the analysis becomes much 
more complicated if one acts affirmatively to establish a special, legal duty-
imposing relationship with the suffering individual (for instance, by becoming 
his doctor).43 Again, the law prohibiting homicide applies presumptively to 
affirmative killing behavior. It presumptively does not apply to passive 
killing behavior.
Even when passive behavior is criminalized, the penalty may be less 
severe than its active counterpart. Thus, the act of filing a false tax return is 
punished as a federal felony. By contrast, the failure to file a tax return 
41 E.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
42 E.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983).
43 See, e.g., id.  at 1017-19.
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altogether is a misdemeanor even though the burden on the government’s 
collection of owed taxes is arguably more burdened by an intentional failure 
to file than by an intentionally inaccurate filing.44
Similar differential treatment occurs in torts and contracts. For 
example, tort liability is imposed for affirmatively inflicting harm, but often 
there is none for passively causing harm – for instance, failing to rescue.45
The law of fraud and misrepresentation in both torts and contracts has 
developed from a basic distinction between affirmative lies – say, about the 
condition of goods offered for sale – which are actionable, and the failure to 
disclose the true condition of goods, which generally is not.46 While these 
developments have generated certain exceptions that impose an affirmative 
duty to speak, they nevertheless leave the presumptive permissibility of 
silence in place.
Interesting examples of this propensity to allocate disproportionate 
legal obligations to affirmative action comes from the federal taxation of 
wealth. Generally speaking, active acquisition of wealth is taxed at higher 
44 Compare I.R.C. § 7203 (failure to file a return is a misdemeanor punishable 
by a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to 1 year), with id. § 7206 
(willful filing of a false return is a felony punishable by a fine of up to 
$100,000 and imprisonment of up to 3 years). I thank Alice Abreu for this 
example.
45 Christopher H. White, Note & Comment, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: 
The Case for Reform of the Rescue Doctrine, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 507, 510-19 
(2002).
46 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1981), with id. § 
161. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1965), with id. § 551. I 
thank Eleanor Myers for these examples.
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rates than passive acquisition. Thus, earned income is taxed, but gifts and 
inherited wealth are largely untaxed.47 Stock dividends, which are not 
themselves the product of action, but are derived from the action of acquiring 
ownership shares in a corporation, are taxed but at a substantially lower rate 
than is earned income.48
All of these examples illustrate the tendency of the action bias to 
impose legal duties as a consequence of action and, conversely, to immunize 
passive conduct from legal obligation even when that passivity generates 
effects similar to those caused by action. In this sense, the “sliding scale” test 
of Zippo Dot Com reflects the action bias. Causing bad effects in the forum 
state through an interactive Web site will generate sufficient contacts to 
support the obligation to answer for those effects in the forum’s courts – that 
is, to support the forum’s assertion of personal jurisdiction. Causing the same 
bad effects through a passive site will likely not generate the requisite 
minimum contacts.
Of course, there is no intrinsic property of law that demands the action 
bias. As is well known, continental Europe has a long tradition of imposing 
legal liability for harm-causing inaction.49 So what accounts for this action 
bias in American law?
47 I.R.C. § 102 (excluding gifts and inheritances from income).
48 I.R.C. § 1(h). I thank Alice Abreu for both of the examples in this 
paragraph.
49 See, e.g., White, supra note 45, at 510 n.16. (“Duty to rescue laws are 
longstanding in many European nations. Portugal adopted the first such long 
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III
The Immigrant’s Tale
I have argued elsewhere that the inevitable choices that must be made 
in the shaping of a community’s legal doctrine define the character of that 
community.50 Furthermore, I have suggested that in making those choices 
about law, it is important for a community to maintain at least a rough 
continuity with the choices made in the past.51 Also linked to the care and 
maintenance of a community’s self-definitions are its myths, the stories that 
members of the community tell themselves about their past.52  And many of 
the stories that are part and parcel of the self-identity of the United States53
in 1867.The Netherlands, Finland, and Italy all enacted similar legislation in 
the nineteenth century, and most of the other countries of continental Europe 
did so in the early to middle twentieth century.”)
50 Richard K. Greenstein, The Three Faces of ORPP: Value Clashes in the 
Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 95 (1993).
51 Richard K. Greenstein, Why the Rule of Law? 66 LA. L. REV. 63 (2005).
52 See, e.g., RICHARD HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LIVES BY (2003); LAUREL T. 
ULRICH, THE AGE OF HOMESPUN: OBJECTS AND STORIES IN THE CREATION OF AN 
AMERICAN MYTH (2001).
53 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that there is a simple American self-
identity or that all members of the American polity share a single 
understanding of what the United States is “about.” I do mean to suggest 
that there is a traditional and even dominant understanding of the nation’s 
history and character that is transmitted officially (through public education 
and other governmental activities) and informally through routine social 
interactions.
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narrate the adventures of a stock character,54 whom I will call the 
Immigrant. 
The basic story of the Immigrant’s Tale is that of leaving an old home 
to come to a new home. In the traditional version of this story, the new home 
is America, and the reasons for coming to America are diverse. They include 
flight from poverty or persecution, but also more affirmative desires for a
better life and for adventure.55
54 The use of “stock stories” as a tool for legal analysis was first suggested by 
Gerald Lopez in 1984:
Human beings think about social interaction in story form. We see and 
understand the world through "stock stories." These stories help us 
interpret the everyday world with limited information and help us 
make choices about asserting our own needs and responding to other 
people. These stock stories embody our deepest human, social and 
political values. At the same time, they help us carry out the routine 
activities of life without constantly having to analyze or question what 
we are doing. When we face choices in life, stock stories help us 
understand and decide; they also may disguise and distort. To solve a 
problem through persuasion of another, we therefore must understand 
and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell 
a plausible and compelling story--one that moves that person to grant 
the remedy we want.
Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984)(citations 
omitted).
55 Evidence that the Immigrant Tale is a story about the dominant American 
culture is, of course, the fact of the slave trade. The story of African 
Americans is not illuminated by the Immigrant’s Tale. Insofar as successful 
assimilation by individuals and groups into the mainstream of American 
society means internalizing the mainstream stories, African-Americans 
would have to adopt a perspective that fundamentally denies their particular 
history. This is, arguably, one more example of the “double-consciousness” 
described by W.E.B Dubois. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, in 
THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 214-15 (Avon Books 1965) (1903). It may also be an 
important piece of the not-yet-solved problem of race in American society.
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The Immigrant must cross a boundary to reach the new home, and this 
boundary crossing is fraught with some danger. In the traditional version, 
the crucial boundary is the border surrounding the United States, and the 
danger may be physical, but is more often political: i.e., rejection and 
deportation. Thus, entering the United States through Ellis Island or by 
crossing the Rio Grande River is a source of dramatic incidents in many 
tellings of the Immigrant’s Tale.
Upon successful arrival, the Immigrant must create a new home. In 
the traditional version, the Immigrant might eventually assimilate into 
existing American communities. Or the Immigrant might join with other 
Immigrants in creating a subcommunity that is contained within or must 
interact with larger, already existing American communities.56 Or the 
Immigrant might join with other Immigrants in creating self-contained and 
self-sufficient communities.57
Two variations of the Immigrant contribute importantly to the self-
definition of the United States. One is the Pilgrim. Pilgrims are among the 
original foreign settlers in America who left their European homes, often in 
response to religious persecution, to establish a new home on the North 
American continent. The dangerous boundary that had to be traversed was 
the Atlantic Ocean, and the communities founded by the Pilgrims were often 
new and largely autarkic communities.
56 For example, the ethnic “neighborhoods” of many large American cities.
57 For example, the Amish communities in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
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The second important variation is the Pioneer. The Pioneer was
something of an internal Immigrant, who left an American home (typically in 
the eastern part of the United States) and traveled west in search of 
adventure, wealth, and so forth. The dangerous boundary separated the 
civilization of the eastern United States from the unsettled wilderness of the 
West. The new home might be one previously established by previous 
Pioneers (Californian communities in many of these stories) or a brand new 
home carved out of the wilderness.
It is important to note that stories about Immigrants, Pilgrims, and 
Pioneers58 are largely tales about ordinary people. These are not the stories of
America’s heroes or larger-than-life villains; rather, they concern the 
proletarians, merchants, farmers, ranchers, and adventurers who formed the 
American polity and the various communities it comprises. In this sense, the 
Immigrant is a peculiarly American character. It is not that other nations 
have not had Immigrants; the point rather is that in most other countries the 
Immigrant is an outsider who either remains an outsider or is absorbed into 
the indigenous population. By contrast, America’s indigenous population, 
native American Indians, has from the outset been cast in the role of 
outsider. It is the newcomers, the Immigrants, who are regarded in the 
58 In the remaining text, the terms “Immigrant” and “Immigrants” refer 
alternatively to the traditional immigrants who come to the United States 
from another country and to the collective group of Immigrants, Pilgrims, and 
Pioneers. The particular contexts should make clear which meaning is being 
employed.
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historical consciousness of the United States as the core population, and the 
identities of these ordinary folks – as German-Americans, Chinese -
Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and the 
like – are unavoidably linked to the old homes that they or their Immigrant 
ancestors left.
What is noteworthy about the Immigrant story for our purposes is that 
the acquisition of citizenship in a community and the assumption of the 
political and social obligations that go with that citizenship are matters of 
choice. The Immigrant chooses to leave home, to cross the dangerous 
boundary, and to establish a new home. And thus the social obligations that 
come with being a part of a community are a function of those choices. 
This notion that individuals acquire social obligations by choice 
contrasts with some of the most venerable political ideas in Western thought. 
In Ancient Greek political theory, for example, individuals do not choose to be 
part of a community. For Aristotle, a human being’s essential nature, 
rationality, required political communities to flourish: “Man is by nature a 
political animal.”59 Thus, humans do not choose to join communities; rather, 
communities are necessary to become fully human.60
English political theory of the Enlightenment, on the other hand, 
conceived of the moral justification for political society as resting on an 
59 ARISTOTLE, POLITICA 1253a (Benjamin Jowett, trans., Random House 1947).
60 “The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual 
is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing . . . .” Id.
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implicit contract.61 This contract, importantly, is a logical, not an historical 
foundation. That is, the “agreement” described in the writings of Hobbes and 
Locke that converted human society from a state of nature to a polity is 
hypothetical and serves as a philosophical construct that confirms moral 
legitimacy on the constraints imposed by civil society on the “natural rights” 
of individuals. English political philosophy of the Enlightenment thereby 
gives moral priority to the individual, in contrast with, say, Aristotelian 
theory, which gives moral priority to the community.
On the other hand, American history is liberally sprinkled with actual 
written agreements that defined the political contours of civil society: the 
Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, 
among others. As well, membership is American society is generally 
understood to be a matter of choice – not only for the 
Immigrant/Pilgrim/Pioneer, but even for those who are born and remain 
within the settled United States.62 Put another way, while social contract 
61 The classic English texts explicating the social contract are THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL ch. 13-17 (Michael Oakeshott 
ed., Collier Books 1962) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT passim (Thomas P. Peardon, ed., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 
1952) (1690).
62 The traditional American label for the integration of an individual into a 
particular political community is citizenship or domicile. As the 
Restatement(Second) of Conflict of Laws indicates, while everyone has a 
“domicil of origin” at birth, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 
(1969), a “domicil of choice may be acquired by a person who is legally 
capable of changing his domicil.” Id. § 15. The two requirements of 
establishing such a “domicil of choice” is understood to be within the control 
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theory gives priority to the individual as an abstract proposition, American 
political theory continues to regard the relationship of each actual individual 
and the community as anchored in choice. The obligations I have to the 
United States and to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to the City of 
Philadelphia can all be traced back to my choices; conversely, in the absence 
of the requisite choices, I would be to a remarkable degree insulated from 
political duties.
The idea of choice, which is central to the Immigrant Tale, has several 
elements. The first of these is intentionality.  The leaving of the old home to 
establish the new one is purposeful. The crossing of the dangerous boundary 
emphasizes this aspect of the Immigrant’s voyage by showing that for the 
Immigrant,the establishment of a new home entails risks knowingly 
incurred.63
A second element is the exercise of control through human 
perseverance and ingenuity. The Immigrant, the Pilgrim, and the Pioneer 
generally arrive at the destination with few material resources and must set 
about subduing a hostile environment. Whether that environment is the 
of the individual. The first of these requirements is physical presence in the 
chosen place. Id. §§ 15, 16. However, presence “under physical or legal 
compulsion” does not satisfy this requirement. Id. § 17. The second 
requirement is the subjective intention “to make that place his home for the 
time at least.” Id. § 18. 
My colleague Craig Green observes that this traditional identification of 
domicile with individual choice is reflected in the slogan: “America – Love it 
or leave it!”
63 But see supra note 55.
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indifferent urbanism of Manhattan or the hostile wilderness of Plymouth 
Rock or the Great Plains, the Immigrant must use judgment, skill, and hard 
work to survive and flourish.
This emphasis on gaining control over the Immigrant’s environment, 
in turn, implicates the third element: action. The tradition of Western 
European theorizing on human mastery over the world has emphasized two 
primary modes of exercising control. The most ancient is the invocation of 
divine assistance;64 the second is the exercise of human reason.65 While 
various stories of Immigrants, Pioneers, and especially Pilgrims might have 
their spiritual dimensions, these accounts are not primarily about religion or 
reason; they are largely about action – vigorous, sometimes heroic activity 
that overcomes the obstacles and creates the new home. 
The Immigrant Tale, therefore, is a narrative in which the individual’s 
place in the world is not determined by the ordering of reason, deities, class, 
fortune, and so forth; rather, the individual affirmatively makes his or her 
64 The Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) is replete with well-known examples of 
this tradition – for instance, Joshua 10:12-13:
On the day the Lord gave the Amorites over to Israel, Joshua said to 
the Lord in the presence of Israel: "O sun, stand still over Gibeon, O 
moon, over the Valley of Aijalon." So the sun stood still, and the moon 
stopped, till the nation avenged itself on its enemies, as it is written in 
the Book of Jashar. The sun stopped in the middle of the sky and 
delayed going down about a full day.
65 In the West, this tradition dates back to the Ionian philosophers in the 
sixth and fifth centuries B.C. and continues through to the science of today.
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place. By attributing success to active, hard work, the story is one of earned 
prosperity. It is, in short, a story redolent of traditional American values.66
IV
The Action Bias in American Law (Part 2)
The bias toward predicating legal obligations on active rather than 
passive conduct reflects the values central to the Immigrant story. In general 
terms, that story is about participation in a political community. The 
individual joins or creates a political community through intentional action 
that has as its goal mastering the environment to create a home. 
If community affiliation is a function of individual choice, then we 
might think that legal obligations are triggered by intentional affiliating 
action. That is, by choosing to affiliate with a political community, we assume 
legal duties toward that community and toward its members. They are, as it 
were, the quid pro quo for the benefits of this chosen affiliation. 
The action bias translates this general point into the definition of 
particular legal duties. By actively inserting ourselves into the community, 
we presumptively take on particular obligations appropriate to that action. 
Conversely, when we remain passive with respect to the community, we are 
presumptively free of obligation. Put another way, when we choose to interact 
66 For a discussion of the work of novelist Horatio Alger, whose novels 
illustrated a belief in the power of individual character to overcome adversity 
see Stefan Kanfer, Horatio Alger: The Moral of the Story (visited 2/18/06) 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_4_urbanities-the_moral.html.
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with the community, that interaction will be governed by law that imposes 
limits on and, thus, potential liability for our conduct; however, when we 
choose not to interact, the law imposes little or no liability for the 
consequences of that passivity.67
Consider once again homicide as paradigmatic of the action bias. You 
will recall the example: If I fail to rescue an unconscious eleven-year-old 
stranger from a shallow pool of water, I am presumptively not criminally 
liable when she subsequently drowns. On the other hand, if the person in the 
water is my eleven-year-old daughter, I would be liable for her death. The 
difference is that the law has “otherwise imposed” on me a duty to care for
my daughter, whereas it has not done so for the stranger. By contrast, if I act 
affirmatively to kill another – by shooting, stabbing, poisoning, drowning, etc 
– I am presumptively liable for that person’s death, irrespective of whether 
the victim is a stranger or my daughter.
My shooting of a person is an action that reveals my intention both 
with regard to the act of shooting and its socially unacceptable consequences 
67 As noted earlier, the Immigrant’s Tale is a story that resonates with the 
histories of certain groups, but not to others, including African Americans 
and Native American Indians. See supra note 55 and text accompanying note 
58. Accordingly, the centrality of action in determining one’s legal rights and 
obligation associates the action bias with dominant groups, precisely the 
groups most able to shape the law. Put bluntly, at various points in our 
history, African Americans, Native Americans, women, and others have been 
disabled from determining their legal identities through the active assertion 
of will; in fact, those identities have been largely imposed against their will 
by the prevailing legal regime (e.g., slave codes, “treaties” with the Indian 
Nations, coverture, the World War II internment of Japanese Americans 
living on the west coast of the United States). 
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(whether what is intended is killing, wounding, or frightening). Moreover, it 
reflects an attempt to aggressively gain control over another through 
violence. By contrast, my passive behavior of refusing to rescue the drowning 
stranger asserts no control over another. Moreover, my intention expressed 
through this behavior is clear with regard to the refusal, but ambiguous with 
regard to the consequences of that refusal. (Is harm intended, or do I just 
want to avoid getting involved, or am I trying to get somewhere in a hurry?)
We can look at this from a somewhat different perspective. The 
Immigrant’s story is about leaving home, crossing a dangerous boundary, and 
establishing a new home through one’s active conduct; that is to say, it is a 
story about altering the status quo. Of the various homicides described above, 
my passive behavior of refusing to rescue a stranger, insofar as my 
unambiguous intentions are concerned, maintains the status quo, whereas 
my shooting of anyone alters the status quo.  Similarly, my adoption of the 
eleven-year-old stranger would intentionally alter the status quo. My legal
duty to refrain from deadly conduct tracks this point: Conduct that alters the 
status quo leads to liability for resulting death; by contrast, conduct that 
leaves the status quo in place does not support criminal liability, even if 
death results.
In sum, the Immigrant’s story is a narrative about dramatic, 
intentional, status quo-altering behavior. More specifically, it is a narrative 
about acting to insert oneself into a new political community or to create such 
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a community.  The action bias predicates legal duties on intentional, status 
quo-altering behavior. More specifically, the action bias predicates certain 
legal duties on affirmative acts of affiliation with a political community. 
Among this set of legal duties is that of submission to the jurisdiction of the 
community’s courts. That is the thrust of personal jurisdiction doctrine as 
traditionally understood, and that is the thrust of the “sliding scale” test of 
Zippo Dot Com.
V
The Triumph of Zippo Dot Com (Part 2)
In the Immigrant’s Tale, the individual joins or creates a political 
community through intentional action. This intentional affiliating action, in 
turn, triggers legal obligations. That is, by choosing to affiliate with a 
political community, we assume legal duties toward that community and 
toward its members. Among these legal duties is that of submission to the 
jurisdiction of the community’s courts.
We see in the traditional understanding of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine all the key features of this narrative and the consequent action bias 
in American law. Consider the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Hanson v. 
Denckla: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with 
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the forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act 
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.68
Here are requirements that defendant affiliate with the forum (“invoking the 
benefits and protections of [the forum’s] laws”), that the affiliating conduct be 
intentional (“purposeful avail[ment]”), and that the affiliating conduct be 
active (“conducting activities”). Moreover, we see that an important reason 
for requiring intentional and active affiliating conduct is to establish that 
defendant (not others) be in control of the affiliating contacts (“unilateral 
activity of [others] cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State”).69 This assertion of control by means of intentional action confers on 
defendant’s contacts with the forum a quality that makes the forum’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over defendant consistent with “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”
68 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
69 The centrality of control in is emphasized by two wrinkles in the 
traditional doctrine of presence. The “minimum contacts” test is itself derived 
by analogy from the older doctrine of presence: that a court presumptively 
has jurisdiction over a defendant who is present within the forum state. See, 
International Shoe,  326 U.S at 318; see also, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877). However, courts have developed two important exceptions to the 
sufficiency of presence: Jurisdiction will not be asserted by a court when 
defendant’s presence within the jurisdiction as the result of duress, see, e.g., 
Croucher v. Croucher, 200 N.E.2d 854 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964), or fraud, see, e.g., 
Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (2d Cir. 1917). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  § 82 (1969). That is, when 
defendant’s affiliation with the forum is not voluntary – not fully within the 
control of defendant – the affiliating contacts will not support jurisdiction.
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And while fairness would obviously support jurisdiction over claims 
arising out of those specific contacts,70 a defendant whose affiliating activities 
are “continuous” and “substantial” might well be subject to jurisdiction “on 
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.”71 This distinction within personal jurisdiction doctrine between 
“specific” and “general” jurisdiction72 both underscores and adds nuance to 
the idea that legal obligations arise out of intentional affiliations with a 
political community. Different kinds of contacts with the forum indicate 
different levels of intended affiliation. Someone driving through a state seems 
to intend a highly transient affiliation, while someone operating a business 
within a state expresses the intention to become an enduring and integral 
part of the community.73
We can now see why the “sliding scale” test of Zippo Dot Com might 
have wide appeal among courts considering the constitutional limits on 
personal jurisdiction in cases arising out of Internet activities: It resonates 
exquisitely with the action bias.
70 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
71 Id. at 318. 
72 The origin of these terms is Arthur Taylor von Mehren and Philip A. 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1121 (1966).
73 For other ways of understanding the distinction see William M. Richman, 
A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific 
Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1336, 1345 (1984) (review essay)
(distinction anchored in considerations of fairness); Brilmayer, How Contacts 
Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S. CT. REV. 
77 (distinction anchored in considerations of sovereignty).
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The court’s articulation of the test focuses on the two ends of the scale. 
At one end is the “passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it.” 74 Such a site, the 
court tells us “is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”75 Why 
not? Because we are looking for action on the part of defendant in affiliating 
with the forum. Defendant must have “reached out” and thereby “originated 
and maintained contacts” with the forum for jurisdiction to be permissible. 76
The passive site does not involve such reaching out. On the contrary, the 
contacts with the forum are initiated by forum Internet users who access 
defendant’s Web site. This “unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of 
contact with the forum State.”77 That is, characterizing defendant’s Web site 
as “passive” indicates defendant’s lack of control over who accesses the site 
and, consequently and, therefore, over what states are impacted by the 
information contained on the site. 
Jack’s Web site is passive in this sense, and accordingly it might seem 
odd to conclude that Jack has “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege 
of conducting activities” in North Dakota simply because Colby and Brie and, 
perhaps, others in that state had connected to his Web site. Notwithstanding 
74 Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1125 (discussing Bensusan Restaurant Corp., v. King, 937 F. Supp. 
295 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).
77 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
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the appreciable effects that Jack’s Web page had in North Dakota, the fact is 
that he has little control over from whom and, more to the point, from where 
his page is accessed. Seen through the lens of the action bias, this lack of 
control over the contacts that connect defendant to the forum subverts the 
justification for imposing a legal obligation of submission to the jurisdiction of 
the forum’s courts.
At the other end of the sliding scale we find “situations where a 
defendant clearly does business over the Internet.” Through such Web sites, 
defendant engages in specific transactions with a specific individual located 
in a specific state. Here we seem to have the kind of intentional and active 
affiliation with the forum demanded by the action bias. In such instances, 
“[i]f the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign 
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper.”78
Of course, this analysis avoids coming to grip with what we have seen 
to be a characteristic quality of the Internet is precisely that it enables 
individuals to transact with one another without either knowing where the 
other is geographically located. In short, the geographic indeterminacy 
discussed earlier applies just as much to interactive sites as to passive sites.
Consider, for example, a Web-based commercial transaction: say, the 
purchase on-line of a computer from a New York retailer by a North Dakota 
78 Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124
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customer. The exchange of information between the customer and the 
computer seller’s Web site will likely involve no human being besides the 
customer. The location of the server on which the seller’s Web site is stored 
will likely be unknown to the consumer. The geographical location of the 
consumer (the eventual forum) will likely be unknown to any human being in 
the seller’s company until the order has been placed. It is certainly the case 
that the subsequent sending of the computer to the forum state will be 
responsive to the customer’s initial contact; however, a defendant’s activity 
directed toward the forum in response to contacts initiated by someone other 
than defendant has been held not to be indicative of the “purposeful 
avail[ment] . . . of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state” 
required to support personal jurisdiction.79 And yet, the Ninth Circuit, for 
instance, found that such Web-based retail transactions supplied a predicate 
for asserting jurisdiction under the “sliding scale” test.80
Hence, the triumph of Zippo Dot Com’s “sliding scale” test is difficult to 
justify analytically in the sense that the test fails to address the peculiarities 
of the Internet that render problematic the traditional territorialist 
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction doctrine. Moreover, it is difficult to 
justify in terms of policy. Why should conduct that has identifiable harmful 
effects within a jurisdiction escape adjudication by the courts of that state? 
79 See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252-253; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 
84, 93-94 (1978).
80 Gator Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Why should a lack of intentional connection with the territory of the forum 
count against jurisdiction when activities in cyberspace are by their very 
nature territorially indeterminate? The continued dominance of the “sliding 
scale” test suggests the power of the action bias over such analytical and 
policy concerns.
VI
Postscript: The Sovereign’s Tale
The Immigrant’s Tale can itself be subsumed under a larger narrative, 
epitomized by the motto on the Great Seal of the United States: “e pluribus 
unum.” The conventional story of America includes the idea that it is a whole 
formed by the coming together of many individual pieces. The Immigrant’s 
story is one aspect of that notion. Americans often refer to their country as “a 
nation of immigrants.” The idea is that true Americans (or the ancestors of 
true Americans) come from elsewhere, having left their homes to create new 
homes in America. (Again, it is, for this reason, not surprising that the only 
Americans who are actually native – who are not immigrants or their 
descendants – have been perpetual political and cultural outsiders 
throughout the nation’s history.) This understanding that we are “one”
formed by the coming together of “many” is a source for the continuous 
tension between a vision of America in which the identity of each individual 
in terms of that former home is preserved and celebrated (the phenomenon of 
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the hyphenated American) and a vision of America as a “melting pot,” in 
which the individual, immigrant identities dissolve into a homogeneous 
American unity.
A second aspect of “e pluribus unum” might be called the “Sovereign’s 
Tale.” It is a political story of a single nation being formed out of individuated 
sovereignties – the states – which retain aspects of their original sovereignty. 
This story not only depicts a powerful, sometimes violent tension between 
state and national authority, but describes a complex and problematic 
relationship among the states themselves, as they seek to accommodate their 
simultaneous independence and interdependence.
The impact of this story on the development of personal jurisdiction is 
central to the most famous decision in that doctrine’s history: Pennoyer v. 
Neff.81 That case invalidated Oregon’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
an individual located and domiciled in California. The Supreme Court’s 
rationale was nicely summarized a century later:
Mr. Justice Field's opinion for the Court focused on the 
territorial limits of the States’ judicial powers. Although recognizing 
that the States are not truly independent sovereigns, Mr. Justice Field 
found that their jurisdiction was defined by the principles of “public 
law” that regulate the relationships among independent nations. The 
first of those principles was “that every State possesses exclusive 
81 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory.” The second was “that no State can exercise direct 
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its 
territory.” . . . Thus, “in virtue of the State’s jurisdiction over the 
property of the non-resident situated within its limits,” the state courts 
“can inquire into that non-resident's obligations to its own citizens . . . 
to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property.” . . . 
The Court recognized that if the conclusions of that inquiry were 
adverse to the non-resident property owner, his interest in the 
property would be affected. . . . Similarly, if the defendant consented to 
the jurisdiction of the state courts or was personally served within the 
State, a judgment could affect his interest in property outside the 
State. But any attempt “directly” to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the 
inherent limits of the State’s power.82
Pennoyer anchored its analysis in federalism principles, rather than in 
due process, for the simple reason that the fourteenth amendment’s due 
process clause was not yet in effect at the time of the juridical events being 
challenged in the case. Nonetheless, dicta in the case suggested that the 
extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction would violate due process norms,83
82 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 187, 197 (1977)(citations omitted).
83 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33.
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and subsequent personal jurisdiction cases seemed to focus exclusively on 
that clause. 
Since the 1945 decision in International Shoe with its emphasis on 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” the Court’s 
pronouncements on the status of Pennoyer‘s state sovereignty rationale have 
been, to put it mildly, inconsistent. A decade after International Shoe the 
Court asserted in Hanson v. Deckla that
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts . . . are more 
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.   
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a 
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he 
has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite 
to its exercise of power over him.84
But in 1977 the Court suggested in Shaffer v. Heitner that with the decision 
in International Shoe, 
the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, 
rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which 
the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry 
into personal jurisdiction.85
84 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
85 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
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Three years later, the Court seemed committed to accommodating both 
dimensions of the doctrine, insisting in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 
that 
[the ‘minimum contacts’ test] can be seen to perform two related, but 
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the 
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to 
ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond 
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system.86
The following year came another flip-flop, with the Court declaring that 
modern personal jurisdiction cases, including World-Wide Volkswagen, are 
concerned exclusively with due process and not with the relationship among 
states.87 And yet, three years after that, the Court applied the “minimum 
contacts” test by means of a multi-factor analysis that included consideration 
of “the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies” and the “shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”88
This back-and-forth on the role of state sovereignty in defining the 
constitutional limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction89 should not 
86 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.  
87 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10 (1982).
88 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
89 Part of the conceptual difficulty lies in the post-Pennoyer tradition of 
discussing the constitutional dimensions of personal jurisdiction doctrine 
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surprise us. Just as the Immigrant’s Tale is a source of the tension between 
the “hyphenated American” and the “melting pot” visions of the United 
States, the Sovereign’s Tale generates its own tension between states’ rights 
and national unity. And just as the explicitly invoked due process clause 
encapsulates the tension of the Immigrant’s Tale, so the shadow -clause of the 
personal jurisdiction cases – the full faith and credit clause – embraces the 
political tension of the Sovereign’s Tale.90
Moreover, as the Immigrant’s Tale illuminates the action bias in 
American law and the instantiation of that bias in the popular “sliding scale” 
test for personal jurisdiction, so we might expect the Sovereign’s Tale, as a 
reflection of fundamentally important political values, to cast its own light on 
the seemingly inevitable triumph of Zippo Dot Com.
exclusively in terms of due process. The natural constitutional home for a 
discussion of the federalism dimension is the full faith and credit clause. U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.”) 
See Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal 
Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HAST. L.J. 855, 860-61 (1987). In contrast to the 
courts’ treatment of personal jurisdiction, analysis of the constitutional limits 
on choice of law has historically invoked both of these clauses, thereby 
providing a vocabulary on which to distinguish fairness considerations from 
those having to do with relations among the states. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)(decided under the due process clause); Bradford 
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)(decided under the full faith 
and credit clause); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964)(decided 
under both the due process and full faith and credit clauses). In recent times, 
the United States Supreme Court has conflated the two inquiries so as to 
dampen the value of these distinct vocabularies. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Justice Steven’s concurring opinion focuses on 
just this problem. Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
90 See discussion in supra note 89.
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Again, my interest is not to debate whether thinking about sovereignty 
in the context of Internet activity makes sense, 91 any more than I am 
concerned with whether the action bias makes sense in that context. I want 
to simply suggest that an analogue to the action bias can be found in what 
might be called the “territory mystique.” The idea that our states are 
analogous to nations and that state borders consequently matter pervades
the law. In personal jurisdiction doctrine, the mystique most clearly 
manifests itself in the “minimum contacts” test. 
Put simply, “minimum contacts” have no necessary relationship to the 
fundamental fairness required by the due process clause.92 One can easily 
depict situations in which requiring a party to litigate in a jurisdiction with 
which that individual has no contacts, minimum or otherwise, is in no way 
unfair. Why, then, require contacts between the party and the forum? The 
answer appears to be a residual territorialism left over from the pre-due 
process days of Pennoyer v. Neff. An important source of that residue is the 
territory mystique, and the background story is the Sovereign’s Tale.
This residual territorialism does not require the intentionality and 
control that are hallmarks of the action bias. At its most extreme, the 
territory mystique can even overwhelm the action bias in personal 
91 For examinations of this normative question see Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951 (2005); Paul 
Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 
(2002).
92 See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 89, at 878-80.
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jurisdiction doctrine and support jurisdiction when no intentional contact 
with the forum exists. Thus, for instance, a party has been held subject to the 
jurisdiction of a state by being served with process while flying over that 
state as a passenger on a commercial airplane.93
Rather, what the territory mystique requires is some activity that 
connects the individual with the geographic territory of the state. Such 
activities may include the individual’s physical presence within the state’s 
borders at the moment that the court asserts its power through service of 
process (the Pennoyer paradigm), past activity of the individual within the 
state that generates the claim before the court (the International Shoe 
paradigm), and some status or past activity that integrates the individual 
into the state’s political community (citizenship/domicile being 
paradigmatic).94 A somewhat late development in personal jurisdiction 
doctrine constitutes a fourth kind of sufficient contact with the forum: 
activity beyond the state’s territorial borders that causes harmful effects 
within the borders of the state.95
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, for the last of these –
projecting harmful effects into the state – to support personal jurisdiction, it 
helps that the conduct producing the harm has been “expressly aimed” at the 
93 Grace v. MacArthur, F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
94 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1947).
95 E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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forum.96 The Sovereign’s Tale helps us make sense of this. If states are 
analogous to nations, then when Nation A’s territory suffers harm as the 
result of the activities of Nation B outside of A’s borders, we might expect as 
a matter of diplomacy that A would discriminate between harm that was 
inadvertent (say, B’s communication satellite falls to earth and lands in A) 
and harm that was “expressly aimed” at A by B (say, B lobs a ballistic missile 
at A). Among American states these diplomatic expectations of comity and 
mutual accommodation are constitutionalized through the requirement of full 
faith and credit. In the context of personal jurisdiction, then, the farther 
defendant’s contacts with the forum stray from the Pennoyer paradigm of 
physical presence, the weaker the apparent influence of the territory 
mystique and the stronger the demands of the action bias (including 
intentionality and control).
Jack’s defamatory Web page caused harmful effects inside North 
Dakota through activity outside that state. The territory mystique should be 
weak in such a situation, thereby requiring that Jack’s defamation be 
“expressly aimed” at North Dakota in order to justify North Dakota 
jurisdiction. Zippo Dot Com‘s “sliding scale” test discriminates between
passive and interactive sites in just this way, requiring the court to ask 
96 IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir.1998); see 
Calder, at 789. But see Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)(utilizing the kind of “stream of commerce” 
analysis discussed in supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text).
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whether Jack’s site was “passive” (i.e., not directed toward any particular 
geographic place) or “interactive” (i.e., actively engaged with persons located 
at identifiable places).
Conclusion
Law is a rhetorical art; the central task of lawyers is to persuade. One 
way of thinking about what makes a doctrinal argument persuasive is to look 
at how debates surrounding difficult questions of law have stabilized and 
been resolved by courts over time. And looking at the career of Zippo Dot 
Com suggests that one thing that might make a particular argument 
persuasive is its resonance with our collective aspirations. 
If we think of ourselves as a nation of immigrants and, more generally, 
of a nation in which individual initiative counts for both merit and blame, 
then a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that emphasizes defendant’s 
intentional and active affiliation with the forum might seem a more fitting 
test than one which predicates jurisdiction on the chance occurrence of 
deleterious effects within the forum. And if we think of ourselves as a nation 
of states – distinct political entities defined by their geographic borders –
then a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that seeks to capture extraterritorial 
behavior aimed at causing harm inside the forum’s borders might seem 
similarly attractive. 
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Looking through these lenses of the action bias and the territory
mystique, a North Dakota court might easily conclude that Jack’s particular 
harm- causing conduct fails to connect directly with North Dakota’s
community concerns. If so, Brie’s argument will fail to persuade, and Jack 
will escape the long-arm jurisdiction of the court.
